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Religious Freedom and Women’s Health — The Litigation  
on Contraception
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, J.D.
Religious Freedom and Women’s Health
Health policy experts widely agree that health care should 
not merely be sickness care; rath-
er, it should actively prevent dis-
ease and preserve wellness. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) contains an 
entire chapter dealing with pre-
vention and public health. The 
ACA also improves private and 
public insurance coverage of pre-
ventive care. One preventive care 
requirement, however, has caused 
a major headache for the Obama 
administration. Indeed, it has pro-
voked charges that the administra-
tion is waging “a war on religion.”
The ACA requires private in-
surers and group health plans 
(except for “grandfathered” plans, 
defined as those that existed at 
the time the ACA became law and 
have not significantly changed) 
to cover preventive services with-
out cost sharing by enrollees. 
This provision does not list the 
covered services, instead refer-
encing the recommendations of 
other federal agencies that deal 
with prevention. It specifically 
requires coverage of women’s 
preventive care and screening 
services “provided for in com-
prehensive guidelines supported 
by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration” (HRSA).
At HRSA’s request, the Insti-
tute of Medicine (IOM) identified 
women’s preventive services that 
should be covered.1 On August 1, 
2011, HRSA released guidelines 
based on the IOM’s recommenda-
tions. Among the services that 
health plans and insurers must 
cover are “all Food and Drug Ad-
ministration–approved contracep-
tive methods.” Coverage must be 
available for plan years beginning 
after August 1, 2012.
Requiring contraception cov-
erage is not a radical innovation. 
Twenty-eight states currently re-
quire insurers (with some excep-
tions) to cover contraceptives.2 
The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission has also con-
cluded that contraception coverage 
is required by the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, although federal 
courts have come to contradicto-
ry conclusions on this question. 
But contraception is considered 
to be a “grave sin” by the Roman 
Catholic church, and a number of 
Protestant organizations object 
specifically to “morning after” 
contraceptives and intrauterine 
devices, which they consider to 
be abortifacients.
In final rules and guidance 
issued in February 2012, the De-
partment of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) recognized these 
concerns. First, it excused from 
compliance with the contraception 
requirement “religious employers,” 
defined to include churches and 
other nonprofit entities that ex-
ist for the inculcation of faith and 
primarily serve and hire adher-
ents to a particular religious faith. 
Second, it imposed a moratorium 
until August 1, 2013, on the ap-
plication of the requirement to 
“religious organizations” — non-
profit entities such as universi-
ties, hospitals, or charities run 
by religious groups that do not 
limit the population they serve 
and employ to adherents to their 
religion. In March, the DHHS pub-
lished an advance notice of pro-
posed rulemaking committing it-
self to finding an approach that 
would ensure employees of reli-
gious organizations (and students 
in religious universities) access to 
contraception without requiring 
the religious organizations to pay 
for it. Such organizations might, 
for example, be excused from 
paying for contraception coverage 
while the insurers that offer their 
group plans covered contracep-
tives using the savings they ac-
crued from not covering un-
planned pregnancies.
This approach was not ac-
ceptable to organizations that ob-
ject to contraception. Forty federal 
lawsuits have been filed challeng-
ing the contraception policy.3 Most 
have been filed by religious or-
ganizations that do not qualify for 
the religious-employer exception. 
A number, however, have been 
filed by for-profit businesses 
whose owners have personal re-
ligious objections to contracep-
tion. The governors of seven states 
joined one lawsuit supporting the 
religious-organization plaintiffs.
Although the claims in these 
lawsuits are fundamentally 
grounded in the right to reli-
gious freedom enshrined in the 
First Amendment, they are not 
primarily constitutional claims. 
The Supreme Court decided more 
than two decades ago that the First 
Amendment does not prohibit a 
“neutral law of general applicabil-
ity” that burdens religious con-
duct.4 Rather, the litigation is 
based primarily on the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, which 
Congress adopted in response to 
that Supreme Court decision. This 
Act prohibits the federal govern-
ment from substantially burden-
ing the free exercise of religion 
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unless it establishes that a require-
ment “is in furtherance of a com-
pelling governmental interest” and 
“is the least restrictive means of 
furthering” that interest.5
To date, district courts have 
issued decisions in 11 cases (see 
box), with more being decided 
every week. The courts have dis-
missed as premature claims 
brought by religious organiza-
tions in 6 cases. These organi-
zations are still protected by the 
moratorium and have therefore 
not yet suffered an injury. Be-
cause the DHHS has not yet de-
cided how it is going to handle 
the religious-organization issue, 
the dispute of these organizations 
with the agency is not yet timely. 
They can return to court once the 
DHHS announces its final rule if 
they are not satisfied. One court, 
however, has held that religious 
organizations are already injured 
by the rule and can sue.
The cases brought by the sec-
ular employers are more problem-
atic. District courts in three of these 
cases have issued a temporary or-
der prohibiting the federal govern-
ment from forcing the employer to 
comply with the contraception re-
quirement while the court con-
siders the case. One other court 
has dismissed a secular-employ-
er case on the merits, although 
its decision has been stayed by a 
federal appellate court. Another 
court denied a preliminary in-
junction, holding that the employ-
er was unlikely to succeed on its 
legal claim.
One issue in the secular- 
employer cases is whether a pri-
vate, secular, for-profit corpora-
tion can hold protected religious 
beliefs. The Supreme Court has 
held that corporations are pro-
tected by the First Amendment’s 
freedom-of-speech provisions, but 
corporations are not protected 
by other constitutional provisions, 
such as the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. 
In one of the contraception cas-
es, the court held that a secular, 
for-profit corporation cannot hold 
a religious belief. In other cases, 
however, the courts have allowed 
privately held corporations to as-
sert the religious beliefs of their 
individual owners. These decisions 
run contrary to the general ap-
proach of the law, which refuses 
to “pierce the corporate veil” sep-
arating corporations from their 
owners.
Another issue is whether the 
contraception requirement fur-
thers a compelling governmental 
interest and is the least restrictive 
means of doing so. The govern-
ment argues that the requirement 
promotes a compelling interest in 
public health, citing the IOM’s 
conclusion that family planning 
provides health benefits for both 
women and their children. It also 
contends that the rule promotes 
gender equity, freeing women 
from a significant expense that 
men do not incur and giving them 
greater freedom to pursue their 
life plans. Courts that have en-
joined the enforcement of the re-
quirement, however, have asked 
why, if the interests the law pro-
motes are compelling, it excludes 
from protection millions of em-
ployees who are covered by grand-
fathered plans or who work for 
religious employers or for small 
employers (which are not required 
to provide health insurance). One 
court also suggested that the gov-
ernment’s goal could be achieved 
through a public program instead 
of employer coverage.
Perhaps the most interesting 
question, however, is whether the 
Federal Court Cases Challenging the Preventive Services Mandate  
of the Affordable Care Act.
• Courts have dismissed five cases brought by religious organizations that are cov-
ered by the current moratorium because their challenge is premature: State of 
Nebraska v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, July 17, 2012); 
Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
[D.D.C.], July 18, 2012); Wheaton College v. Sebelius (D.D.C. August 24, 2012); 
Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Tennessee, November 21, 2012); Zubik v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, November 27, 2012).
• One court has permitted claims brought by some religious organizations to pro-
ceed: Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York, December 4, 2012).
• One court has dismissed a claim brought by a for-profit employer as not stating 
a legal claim: O’Brien v. United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, September 28, 2012). 
A federal appeals court has stayed this decision (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, November 28, 2012).
• In two cases brought by for-profit employers, the court has granted a preliminary 
injunction blocking the enforcement of the mandate until the court can give the 
case full consideration: Newland v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado, July 27, 2012); and Tyndale House Publishers v. Sebelius (D.D.C. Novem-
ber 16, 2012).
• In one other case, the court granted a preliminary injunction to a for-profit employer 
but denied relief to a religious-organization plaintiff that is protected by the mora-
torium: Legatus v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
October 31, 2012).
• In one other case, the court denied a for-profit corporation’s request for a prelimi-
nary injunction, finding that corporations did not have protected rights under the 
Free Exercise Clause and that the individual plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of 
success on their legal claim: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma, November 19, 2012).
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requirement substantially burdens 
the religious beliefs of employers. 
Two courts have observed that the 
rule does not require employers 
to use contraceptives or even to 
approve of their use. It asks the 
employer only to make a benefit 
available, which the employee 
must then decide whether or not 
to use. Employers object, howev-
er, that they should not have to 
pay for services that they con-
sider to be morally wrong. The 
question of whose interests and 
beliefs — those of the employer 
or those of the employee — ought 
to determine access to contracep-
tion benefits is one that the courts, 
and no doubt ultimately the Su-
preme Court, will have to decide.
Disclosure forms provided by the author 
are available with the full text of this arti-
cle at NEJM.org.
From Washington and Lee University 
School of Law, Lexington, VA.
This article was published on December 19, 
2012, at NEJM.org.
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Shared Decision Making to Improve Care and Reduce Costs
Emily Oshima Lee, M.A., and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, M.D., Ph.D.
A sleeper provision of the Af-fordable Care Act (ACA) en-
courages greater use of shared 
decision making in health care. 
For many health situations in 
which there’s not one clearly su-
perior course of treatment, shared 
decision making can ensure that 
medical care better aligns with 
patients’ preferences and values. 
One way to implement this ap-
proach is by using patient deci-
sion aids — written materials, 
videos, or interactive electronic 
presentations designed to inform 
patients and their families about 
care options; each option’s out-
comes, including benefits and 
possible side effects; the health 
care team’s skills; and costs. 
Shared decision making has the 
potential to provide numerous 
benefits for patients, clinicians, 
and the health care system, in-
cluding increased patient knowl-
edge, less anxiety over the care 
process, improved health out-
comes, reductions in unwarrant-
ed variation in care and costs, 
and greater alignment of care 
with patients’ values.
However, more than 2 years 
after enactment of the ACA, little 
has been done to promote shared 
decision making. We believe that 
the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) should 
begin certifying and implement-
ing patient decision aids, aiming 
to achieve three important goals: 
promote an ideal approach to cli-
nician–patient decision making, 
improve the quality of medical 
decisions, and reduce costs.
In a 2001 report, Crossing the 
Quality Chasm, the Institute of Med-
icine recommended redesigning 
health care processes according 
to 10 rules, many of which em-
phasize shared decision making. 
One rule, for instance, underlines 
the importance of the patient as 
the source of control, envision-
ing a health care system that en-
courages shared decision making 
and accommodates patients’ pref-
erences.
Unfortunately, this ideal is in-
consistently realized today. The 
care patients receive doesn’t al-
ways align with their preferences. 
For example, in a study of more 
than 1000 office visits in which 
more than 3500 medical deci-
sions were made, less than 10% 
of decisions met the minimum 
standards for informed decision 
making.1 Similarly, a study 
showed that only 41% of Medi-
care patients believed that their 
treatment reflected their prefer-
ence for palliative care over more 
aggressive interventions.2
There’s also significant varia-
tion in the utilization of proce-
dures, particularly those for pref-
erence-sensitive conditions, which 
suggests that patients may receive 
care aligned not with their values 
and preferences, but with their 
physicians’ payment incentives. 
Among Medicare patients in 
more than 300 hospital regions, 
the rate of joint-replacement pro-
cedures for chronic hip arthritis 
varied by as much as a factor of 
five, and the use of surgery to 
treat lower back pain varied by 
nearly a factor of six. Other stud-
ies have found wide regional varia-
tion in the treatment of early-stage 
breast and prostate cancers and 
in the use of cardiac procedures.
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org on November 11, 2013. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2013 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
